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The Ninth Amendment: A Constitutional 
Challenge to Corporal Punishment in Public 
Schools* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On February 21, 2001, a third grader, Michael Setliff, received three 
blows to the buttocks with a wooden paddle for misbehaving at recess.1  
Prior to the incident, Michael’s parents had specifically requested that he 
not be physically punished.2  As a result of this event, Michael brought 
an action against the school board and principal, alleging that he was 
injured when his principal administered the punishment.3  The court held 
that the school board and principal were not responsible for Michael’s 
injuries and found that their actions were far less severe than those of the 
teacher in Harrell v. Daniels,4 in which the court refused to award 
damages.5  In Harrell, the child who was paddled was taken to an 
emergency room shortly after the paddling.6  A medical report described 
two bluish-red bruises 2 ½” by 3” in width; one bruise was located on the 
buttocks and the other over the left flank.7  In refusing to award damages, 
the court in Harrell took into consideration that the student’s behavior at 
school was disruptive, aggressive, and bizarre, and therefore merited 
such punishment.8  In relying on this holding, the Setliff court dismissed 
Michael’s suit.  The court stated that “by allowing corporal punishment, 
the legislature has recognized a need for such under certain 
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 1. Setliff v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 888 So. 2d 1156, 1158 (La. Ct. App. 2004). 
 2. Id. at 1159. 
 3. Id. at 1156. 
 4. 499 So. 2d 482 (La. Ct. App. 1986). 
 5. Setliff, 888 So. 2d at 1161. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. (citing Harrell). 
 8. Id. 
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circumstances,”9 and that “parents must yield to a higher duty, i.e., that  
which is best for all of the children, as well as those who have the 
enormous responsibility of educating them.”10 
Michael was, in actuality, a fortunate child.  His corporal punishment 
produced minor injuries when compared to many other instances of 
extreme punishment that occur each year.11  Such punishments inflicted 
on children in public schools may come as a surprise for many, 
especially parents with school-aged children.  Do children really deserve 
to be beaten in school for minor disruptions?  Are parents required to 
accept the physical and emotional scars that corporal punishment leaves 
on their children because it is purportedly in the “best interest” of the 
school system?  Is there no constitutional protection available when such 
punishments are administered? 
In 1977 the Supreme Court of the United States directly addressed 
the constitutionality of corporal punishment in Ingraham v. Wright.12  
The Court held, in a five-to-four decision, that the cruel and unusual 
punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment applied only to criminal 
punishments and thus provided no protection against the imposition of 
corporal penalties by school authorities.13  The Court further held that the 
procedural due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
require schools to provide notice and a hearing before application of 
physical discipline.14 
The Court’s decision in Ingraham unfortunately fostered judicial 
indifference to corporal punishment in schools and essentially precluded 
constitutional challenges to such punishments based on the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  Unlike the issues addressed by the Supreme 
Court in Ingraham, however, this Comment argues that the Ninth 
Amendment provides a constitutional challenge to corporal punishment 
in public schools.  Specifically, it argues that parental rights are a clear 
example of rights “retained by the people.”15  Because parents are 
charged with the upbringing of their children, they retain an intrinsic 
right to discipline their children accordingly.  Although other articles and 
commentaries have continually addressed the issue of corporal 
punishment and have fashioned various arguments as to its  
                                                     
 9. Id. at 1162. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See discussion infra Part II.A.2. 
 12. 430 U.S. 651, 653 (1977). 
 13. Id. at 668–69. 
 14. Id. at 682. 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
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unconstitutionality,16 they have failed to consider the implications of the 
Ninth Amendment and the protection it may provide to children. 
Part II of this Comment discusses corporal punishment and examines 
its effects on children.  In addition, it analyzes court decisions discussing 
the use of corporal punishment in public schools.  Part II also sets forth 
the recognition and basis of parental rights and explains the source of this 
privilege.  Finally, it provides background on the Ninth Amendment and 
discusses the competing interpretations.  Part III argues and adopts the 
position that, based on the original intent of the Framers of the 
Constitution, the right to direct the upbringing of a child is a clear 
example of rights “retained by the people” and is a source of 
constitutional protection for the parent.  In addition, it explains how the 
use of corporal punishment in public schools violates this fundamental 
right.  Although Ingraham v. Wright precluded federal constitutional 
challenges to corporal punishment based on the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, a federal cause of action based on the Ninth Amendment 
remains.  Thus, the continuing legal battle against corporal punishment 
should be revisited under this approach. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Corporal Punishment 
Corporal punishment is defined as physical punishment on the 
body.17  More specifically, corporal punishment is the willful and 
                                                     
 16. See, e.g., John Dayton, Corporal Punishment in Public Schools: The Legal and Political 
Battle Continues, 89 EDUC. L. REP. 729, 732–34 (1994) (discussing courts that recognize a valid 
cause of action based on substantive due process rights to be free from corporal punishment by 
public school officials); Andre R. Imbrogno, Corporal Punishment in America’s Public Schools and 
the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Case for Nonratification, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 125, 
138–43 (2000) (discussing a possible protection against corporal punishment by ratification of the 
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child); Jerry R. Parkinson, Federal Court Treatment of 
Corporal Punishment in Public Schools: Jurisprudence that is Literally Shocking to the Conscience, 
39 S.D. L. REV. 276, 302–10 (1994) (discussing various problems with the federal courts’ treatment 
of corporal punishment in public schools). 
 17.   BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (8th ed. 2004). 
Past forms of corporal punishment included branding, binding, mutilation, amputation, 
and the use of the pillory and the stocks.  It was also an element in such violent modes of 
execution as drowning, stoning, burning, hanging, and drawing and quartering . . . .  In 
most parts of Europe and in the United States, such savage penalties were replaced by 
imprisonment during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, although capital 
punishment itself remained.  Physical chastisement became less frequent until, in the 
twentieth century, corporal punishment was either eliminated as a legal penalty or 
restricted to beating with a birch rod, cane, whip, or other scourge.  In ordinary usage the 
term now refers to such penal flagellation. 
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deliberate infliction of physical pain on the person of another to modify 
undesirable behavior.18  Some of the more abusive forms that have been 
litigated include piercing the skin with pins,19 hitting with blunt objects,20 
breaking bones,21 painful limb contortions,22 excessive exercise,23 and 
smacking across the genitals.24 
The Supreme Court has upheld the use of corporal punishment in 
schools: “Teachers may impose reasonable but not excessive force to 
discipline a child.”25  Today, twenty-two states allow some form of 
corporal punishment while twenty-eight have banned the practice.26  
States that forbid the administration “of corporal punishment in their 
public schools have eliminated the practice by statute or state 
regulation.”27  “[T]he existence of corporal punishment [is contingent] 
upon the decisions made by policymakers at a level no broader than the 
state.  Where state law prohibits schools from employing corporal 
punishment, local school administrators are . . . prohibited from utilizing 
this form of discipline.”28  On the other hand, states that allow corporal 
punishment either do not address the matter “in their legislative codes or, 
if permitting the practice by statute, draft the statute in permissive, as 
opposed to mandatory terms, allowing, but not requiring, schools to 
utilize physical force in disciplining their students.”29 
Corporal punishment in school has been justified in several ways.  
Proponents point to the constructive effects corporal punishment is 
                                                                                                                       
Id. (quoting Gordon Hawkins, Corporal Punishment, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 
251 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983)). 
 18. Comm. on Psychosocial Aspects of Child and Family Health, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, 
Guidance for Effective Discipline, 101(4) PEDIATRICS 723–28 (1998), available at http:// 
aappolicy.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/pediatrics;101/4/723.pdf. 
 19. Brooks v. Sch. Bd., 569 F. Supp. 1534, 1534 (E.D. Va. 1983). 
 20. Meyer v. Litwiller, 749 F. Supp. 981, 983–84 (W.D. Mo. 1990). 
 21. Crews v. McQueen, 385 S.E.2d 712, 712 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). 
 22. Willoughby v. Lehrbass, 388 N.W.2d 688, 691 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). 
 23. Waechter v. Sch. Dist. No. 14-030, 773 F. Supp. 1005, 1007 (W.D. Mich. 1991). 
 24. Mott v. Endicott Sch. Dist. No. 308, 713 P.2d 98, 98 (Wash. 1986). 
 25. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 661 (1977). 
 26. Corporal Punishment in School, FAMILY EDUCATION.COM, http://school.familyeducation. 
com/education-and-state/punishment/38377.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2006).  The following states 
continue to permit corporal punishment in the classroom: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, 
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, 
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming.  
Id. 
 27. Imbrogno, supra note 16, at 125 n.2 (citing Susan H. Bitensky, Spare the Rod, Embrace 
Our Humanity: Toward a New Legal Regime Prohibiting Corporal Punishment of Children, 31 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 353 n.4 (1998)). 
 28. Id. at 129. 
 29. Id. 
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thought to have on discipline and order.  Those who favor corporal 
punishment argue it is a tool to deter students from misbehaving.30  It is 
argued that corporal punishment teaches a child appreciation and respect 
for authority and improves moral character.31  In addition, proponents 
suggest that corporal punishment is consistent with “the right of all 
students to receive an education, uninterrupted by a . . . disruptive 
student.”32  Some insist that corporal punishment is a desirable 
alternative to arguably more cruel punishments like suspension.33  
However, proponents of corporal punishment often fail to analyze the 
detrimental effects that the punishment has on children. 
1. The Effects of Corporal Punishment on Children 
Years of research demonstrate that corporal punishment, especially 
in schools, is not effective in helping children control or change 
behavior.  “[C]orporal punishment as a teaching method is simply 
ineffective, or, at best, no more effective than nonviolent disciplinary 
methods that do not carry the risk of individual and societal harm.”34 
Corporal punishment has been linked to violence among children.  
Many child psychologists and professional organizations believe that 
corporal punishment is related to forms of physical violence perpetrated 
against children and that it “leads to children’s increased anger, 
aggression, and tolerance for violence, and ultimately, a more violent 
society.”35  According to the American Academy of Pediatrics Task 
Force on Violence, “the risk of involvement with violence has been 
associated with corporal punishment, viewing violent television, 
exposure to domestic violence and child abuse, and hand-gun 
ownership.”36  The Task Force noted: “no doubt exists that children are 
harmed when they witness violence—cognitively, emotionally, and 
developmentally.  Exposure to violence and victimization are also 
strongly associated with subsequent acts of violence by the victim.”37  
                                                     
 30. Id. at 130. 
 31. Leonard P. Edwards, Corporal Punishment and the Legal System, 36 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 983, 990 (1996). 
 32. Imbrogno, supra note 16, at 130 (quoting Lansing K. Reinholz, A Practical Defense of 
Corporal Punishment in the Schools, in CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: 
READINGS IN HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND ALTERNATIVES 342, 346 (1979)). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Deana Pollard, Banning Child Corporal Punishment, 77 TUL. L. REV. 575, 578 (2003). 
 35. Id. at 577. 
 36. Id. at 584–85. 
 37. Id. (quoting Task Force on Violence, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, The Role of the Pediatrician 
in Youth Violence Prevention in Clinical Practice and at the Community Level, 103 PEDIATRICS 173, 
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“[C]hildren learn violence mainly by example, especially from persons 
they depend upon, and so it should come as no surprise that research 
shows many abused children becoming violent delinquents and criminals 
and, eventually, abusers of their own children.”38  Teachers are an 
example to children; children rely on and trust them.  Arguably, violence 
is a learned behavior.  “When children are disciplined with severe 
corporal punishment . . . it is not surprising that they behave violently 
toward others.”39  In other words, corporal punishment may be linked to 
social learning because children “imitate the aggressive behavior of the 
individual inflicting the punishment upon them.”40 
Studies also show a correlation between corporal punishment and 
substance abuse.  “[C]hildren who are spanked and slapped are twice as 
likely to develop alcohol and other drug abuse problems . . . .”41  In fact, 
“spanking and slapping children is linked to increased rates of anxiety 
disorders, alcohol abuse, drug abuse, anti-social behavior, and to some 
extent, depression.”42  It is not surprising that various organizations are 
attempting to halt the use of corporal punishment in an effort to reduce 
substance abuse.  For example, The Nurturing Program for Families in 
Substance Abuse Treatment and Recovery’s main objective is to 
eliminate substance abuse, and one of its intermediate objectives is to 
provide families with alternatives to corporal punishment.43 
Corporal punishment has also been linked to bullying in schools.  
“Corporal punishment is a degrading and humiliating treatment.  Some 
children, upon seeing an adult in authority behave this way toward a 
child, interpret it as a license for them to do the same.  For this reason, 
the use of corporal punishment promotes bullying, cruelty and 
scapegoating among children.”44 
Finally, opponents of corporal punishment argue that corporal 
punishment as a teaching tool undermines educational policies and have 
                                                                                                                       
179 (1999)). 
 38. Kerby T. Alvy, Violence Sets an Example, PROJECT NOSPANK (2005), http:// 
www.nospank.net/alvy.htm. 
 39. Focus Adolescent Servs., Violence Leads to Violence, http://www.focusas.com/ 
Violence.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2006). 
 40. Imbrogno, supra note 16, at 131. 
 41. Spanking Linked to Substance Abuse, STOPSPANKING.COM, Oct. 7, 1999, http:// 
www.stopspanking.com. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Norma Finkelstein, Dep’t of Health Promotion & Educ., Nurturing Program for Families in 
Substance Abuse Treatment and Recovery, http://www.strengtheningfamilies.org/html/ 
programs_1999/34_NPFSATR.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2006). 
 44. Jordan Riak, Twenty Good Reasons to Stop a Bad Practice, http://oz.plymouth.edu/~lsandy/ 
spanking.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2006). 
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stated that “legislators must . . . consider the educational policy problems 
associated with corporal punishment.”45  For example, opponents argue 
that “[o]fficial state support for striking children in the public schools, 
[sic] and the inequitable administration of corporal punishment . . . 
conflict with legislative policies on child abuse, and on racial, economic, 
and gender equity.”46  Opponents also argue that corporal punishment is 
inconsistent with stated educational policies: 
To the extent that education favors independence and personal 
responsibility, the internalization of social values and self-motivation, 
belief in the intrinsic joy and usefulness of all learning, and preference 
for cooperation, a belief in democracy and joint decision-making, and 
respect for the thoughts and feelings of others within a social group, 
corporal punishment is counterproductive.  It teaches instead the value 
of aggressive physical action as a means of settling problems and relies 
on brute force by the powerful over the weak.  It undercuts the image of 
teacher as exemplar of reasoned behavior, nurturing adult and creative 
problem-solver.47 
2. Corporal Punishment and the Courts 
In Ingraham, the Supreme Court directly addressed the 
constitutionality of corporal punishment.48  The lawsuit in Ingraham was 
brought by two Florida junior high school students against officials of 
the school they attended and the superintendent of their school system, 
challenging the constitutionality of the specific punishment they had 
received.49  The facts in Ingraham indicated that children in the 
plaintiffs’ junior high school were receiving extremely harsh 
punishments, sometimes resulting in severe injuries.50  For example, for 
being slow to respond to a teacher’s instructions, one of the plaintiffs, 
Ingraham, received twenty blows with a paddle while he was held over a 
table.51  The paddling was so severe that he suffered a hematoma, which 
required medical attention and several days’ absence from school.52  The 
other plaintiff, Andrews, was hit on the arm so hard that he did not regain 
                                                     
 45. Dayton, supra note 16, at 736. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. (quoting RONALD T. HYMAN & CHARLES H. RATHBONE, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN 
SCHOOLS: READING THE LAW 20 (1993)). 
 48. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 653 (1977). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 657. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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full use of it for a week.53  Other students testified regarding similar 
experiences.54 
Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of these severe 
punishments.  The Court discussed whether corporal punishment in 
public schools constituted cruel and unusual punishment violating the 
Eighth Amendment and whether the Fourteenth Amendment required 
due process procedures before the administration of punishment upon 
students.55  In deciding the Eighth Amendment issue, the Court held that 
the language of the Eighth Amendment proscribed excessive harshness 
equally in fines, bails, and punishments,56 all of which had been 
associated traditionally with the criminal process, and thus was 
inapplicable to the paddling of students “as a means of maintaining 
discipline in public schools.”57  The Court further reasoned that the 
“openness of the public school and its supervision by the community” 
provided sufficient protections against the cruel and unusual punishment 
of students.58  In deciding the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the Court 
found that “corporal punishment in public schools implicates a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest, but . . . the traditional common-
law remedies are fully adequate to afford due process.”59 
The Ingraham Court may have been accurate, from a historical 
standpoint, in concluding that the Eighth Amendment did not apply 
outside the criminal context and that traditional common-law remedies 
were adequate to afford due process.  However, what opponents find 
particularly disconcerting about the holding is the fact that the Court 
disallowed constitutional challenges based on the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the use of corporal punishment in public schools, 
regardless of its severity. 
The Supreme Court’s appearance of indifference to schoolchildren 
suffering from corporal punishment has trickled down to both state and 
federal courts and has brought about an adverse affect on children.  
Consider, for example, the following cases where the use of corporal 
punishment did not merit constitutional challenges based on the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments.  In 2004, in a Tennessee public school, a 
five-year-old, special-needs student was hit with flyswatters and 
                                                     
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 653. 
 56. Id. at 664. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 670. 
 59. Id. at 672. 
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yardsticks on a daily basis.60  The plaintiffs suggested the student was 
also required to “drink water from a toilet.”61  In Georgia, an eight-year-
old boy was paddled for failure to turn in a homework assignment.62  
When the child attempted to shield himself from a second blow of the 
paddle by placing his hands behind him, his principal broke the boy’s 
arm.63  In a similar case in New Mexico, a nine-year-old girl was struck 
in the leg with a split wooden paddle while the teacher held the child 
upside down by her ankles.64  The split paddle “clapped” and “grabbed” 
the girl’s leg, resulting in a cut in the leg and a permanent two-inch 
scar.65  The girl’s teacher discovered her injuries when the teacher 
“noticed blood coming through [the child’s] clothes.”66  Finally, a 
Michigan fifth-grade, special-education student with a congenital heart 
defect died after being forced to sprint a 350-yard “gut run” for “talking 
in line . . . during recess.”67  School officials were well aware of the 
child’s “medical history, physical limitations, and doctor’s orders” that 
the child was not to engage in “any forced exertion.”68 
The facts in these cases apparently did not amount to “the elements 
of severity”69 required to bring a constitutional challenge for corporal 
punishment because they were outside the criminal context.  In other 
words, these courts likely followed the reasoning employed in Ingraham 
and held that such infliction of punishment was “reasonably necessary 
for the proper education and discipline of the child.”70 
Fortunately, some judges are willing to consider a constitutional 
challenge to corporal punishment.71  For example, in 2005, a teacher in 
Florida subjected an autistic student to the following acts: 
                                                     
 60. Rhodes ex rel. Rhodes v. Wallace, No. 1:05 CV 1020 T AN, 2005 WL 2114080, at *1 
(W.D. Tenn. Aug. 26, 2005). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Crews v. McQueen, 385 S.E.2d 712, 713 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). 
 63. Id. at 713–14. 
 64. Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 653 (10th Cir. 1987). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Waechter v. Sch. Dist. No. 14-030, 773 F. Supp. 1005, 1007 (W.D. Mich. 1991). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 658–59 (1977) (discussing elements of 
constitutional challenges to punishment in educational settings). 
 70. Id. at 670. 
 71. See Thrasher v. Gen. Cas. Co., 732 F. Supp. 966, 967, 971 (W.D. Wis. 1990) (denying 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment when a high school student was thrown into a blackboard 
by the teacher); see also Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1158–59 (6th Cir. 1987) (recognizing 
that excessive corporal punishment may rise to the level of a constitutional violation). 
HAGUE FINAL.DOC 2/23/2007  1:07:25 PM 
438 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
(1) slapping him on the head; (2) grabbing him by the neck and choking 
him; (3) yelling at and intimidating him when he was non-complaint 
[sic] . . . ; (4) placing [him] in a closet and turning off the lights; (5) 
striking him on the buttocks after he had wet his pants, resulting in a 
red mark; and (6) ridiculing and cursing at [him] when he hit himself 
on the head with his hand, saying “you stupid little ass . . . if you want 
to keep banging yourself on the head, then go ahead . . . because you 
deserve it.”72 
The court found that the child stated a claim for a constitutional 
violation.73  Unfortunately, this case and other similar cases seem to 
indicate that the punishment children receive must be classified as 
abhorrent abuse before any constitutional consideration is given.74  In 
other words, the punishment must be so excessive as to be “shocking to 
the conscience.”75  As the Supreme Court stated: “there can be no 
deprivation of substantive rights as long as disciplinary corporal 
punishment is within the limits of the common-law privilege [to use 
reasonable force in disciplining children].”76 
The decision rendered in Ingraham was a clear setback for 
opponents of corporal punishment.  Since Ingraham, many lawsuits have 
arisen over the constitutionality of its use.  Unfortunately, the movement 
toward the abolition of corporal punishment in public schools has made 
slow progress.  The legal battle against corporal punishment continues; 
however, bringing a federal cause of action against its use in schools 
remains extremely difficult under our system of law.77 
B. The Recognition of Parental Rights 
Courts have recognized the existence of parental rights for centuries.  
However, nothing in the Constitution references family or parental 
                                                     
 72. A.B. ex rel. Baez v. Seminole County Sch. Bd., No. 6:05CV8020RL31KRS, 2005 WL 
2105961, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2005) (internal footnotes omitted). 
 73. Id. at *7. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 656 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that corporal 
punishments that are “so grossly excessive as to be shocking to the conscience violate [the student’s] 
substantive due process rights, without regard to the adequacy of state remedies”). 
 76. Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton County Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1074–75 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 676 (1977)) (alteration in original). 
 77. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 651 (holding that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause does not apply to corporal punishment imposed as discipline in 
school and that due process “does not require notice and hearing prior to imposition of corporal 
punishment”). 
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rights.78  Still, various jurisdictions conclude that there is a constitutional 
right to parent and make decisions regarding the welfare of one’s child.  
For example, one court has stated that “[a]t the common law of England, 
a parent’s right to custody and control of minor children was a sacred 
right with which courts would not interfere except where by conduct the 
parent abdicated or forfeited that right.”79  In addition, certain courts 
support the holding that the education and nurturing of a child is a 
fundamental freedom.  For example, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
has recognized that “[a]t common law the principal duties of parents to 
their legitimate children consisted in their maintenance, their protection, 
and their education.”80  For this reason, “the parent . . . was vested with 
supreme control over the child, including its education.”81 
The Supreme Court first upheld parental rights as constitutionally 
protected in the case of Meyer v. Nebraska.82  In this case, the Court 
struck down a statute that prohibited the teaching of foreign languages at 
an elementary school and reasoned that parents had a right to control the 
education of their children because educational choices are fundamental 
to the sphere of the family.83  Two years later in Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters,84 the Court reinforced the barrier around the family when it 
invalidated an Oregon statute requiring parents to send their children to 
public schools.85  The Court stated that the right to bring up children is 
fundamental: “The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who 
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high 
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”86  As both 
cases illustrate, the Supreme Court has given parents great autonomy in 
directing the education and upbringing of their children.  Nevertheless, 
like all rights, the freedom to direct the upbringing of a child is not 
limitless. 
The Court did “not suggest that the Constitution relegates a child to 
the status of a mere chattel, to be treated or mistreated by his or her 
                                                     
 78. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (“The association of people is not 
mentioned in the Constitution nor in the Bill of Rights.”). 
 79. In re Appeal in Maricopa County, Juv. Action No. J-75482, 536 P.2d 197, 206 (Ariz. 1975) 
(en banc) (citing In re Hudson, 126 P.2d 765 (Wash. 1942)). 
 80. Sch. Bd. Dist. No. 18 v. Thompson, 103 P. 578, 578–79 (Okla. 1909). 
 81. Id. 
 82. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 83. See id. at 400 (stating that “it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education 
suitable to their station in life”). 
 84. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 85. Id. at 534–36. 
 86. Id. at 535 (emphasis added). 
HAGUE FINAL.DOC 2/23/2007  1:07:25 PM 
440 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
parents according to their pleasure.”87  “[A] parent shown by clear and 
convincing evidence to be unfit, abandoning, or substantially neglectful 
can be permanently deprived of all parental rights.”88  For example, in 
the case of Prince v. Massachusetts,89 a mother was arrested for having 
one of her children illegally sell religious materials on the street 
corners.90  The mother’s defense was that the law violated her right to 
bring up her child as she saw fit, “which for appellant [meant] to teach 
him the tenets and the practices of their faith.”91  The Supreme Court 
accepted that “the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the 
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for 
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”92  However, the 
Court also stated that “the family itself is not beyond regulation in the 
public interest . . . .  Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well 
being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by 
requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor, 
and in many other ways.”93  Not only do limitations exist in a parent-
child relationship, but the abdication of these rights is prevalent in every 
state. 
Paradoxically, parents do not have a right to abuse their children, but 
they lack a constitutional right to prevent corporal punishment in 
schools.  Certain courts hold that a parent’s rights may be terminated 
“when there is a substantial erosion of the relationship between the 
parent and child which [is] caused at least in part by the parent’s serious 
neglect, abuse, prolonged and unreasonable absence, unreasonable 
failure to visit or communicate, or prolonged imprisonment.”94  Actions 
for the termination of parental rights in the context of abuse, neglect, or 
dependency proceedings are extremely common in the child welfare 
adjudication system.95  In general, the purpose of such proceedings is to 
protect the child, rather than prosecute the parent.96  To terminate a 
parent’s rights, certain courts hold that there must be evidence that a 
                                                     
 87. In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1377 (Utah 1982). 
 88. Id. 
 89. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
 90. Id. at 161. 
 91. Id. at 164. 
 92. Id. at 166. 
 93. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 94. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J. ex rel. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 108 n.1 (1996) (quoting MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 93-15-103(3) (1994)). 
 95. See infra notes 97–98 and accompanying text (discussing case law involving unfitness 
proceedings). 
 96. San Joaquin County Dept. of Human Servs. v. Edward S., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, 497 (Cal. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
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parent is unfit and that a termination of the parent’s rights is in the 
child’s best interest.97  The effect of an order terminating a parent’s rights 
is to sever all the parent’s constitutional rights to the child, in effect 
divesting the parent from family-member status as related to the child.98 
Despite the above-mentioned limitations, the Supreme Court 
recognizes many constitutional protections vested in parents over their 
children, and, having never been overturned, Meyer and Pierce are 
currently good law.  Courts have protected this privilege from the 1920s 
to today, thus embedding it in our common-law tradition. 
C. The Ninth Amendment 
1. Rights Retained by the People 
The Ninth Amendment declares that “[t]he enumeration in the 
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people.”99  The text, on its face, arguably implies 
the rights protected by the Constitution are not limited to its express 
provisions.  This inference invites a possible view that under the Ninth 
Amendment, judges are authorized to protect both express and 
unenumerated rights.  Nevertheless, Ninth Amendment rights have 
always been somewhat elusive.100  As Justice Jackson of the Supreme 
Court stated, “the Ninth Amendment rights which are not to be disturbed 
by the Federal Government are still a mystery to me.”101 
In 1965, in the case of Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court 
established a constitutional right of privacy.102  In his concurring opinion, 
Justice Goldberg stated, “this Court has had little occasion to interpret 
the Ninth Amendment.”103  Because there was no precedent to guide the 
                                                     
 97. See, e.g., Craven v. Doe, 915 P.2d 720, 724 (Idaho 1996) (holding that there was substantial 
competent evidence that supported termination of parental rights due to abandonment, neglect, and 
the best interest of the parent and child under Idaho law); DKM v. RJS, 924 P.2d 985, 987–88 (Wyo. 
1996) (discussing showing of parental unfitness under Wyoming law). 
 98. Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 902 F. Supp. 765, 771 (E.D. Mich. 1995), aff’d, 124 F.3d 774 (6th 
Cir. 1997). 
 99. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
 100. Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REV. 233, 
233 (1983). 
 101. Id. (quoting ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF 
GOVERNMENT 74–75 (1955)). 
 102. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); see also John A. Lynch, Jr., Justice Douglas, the Chesapeake & 
Ohio Canal, and Maryland Legal History, 35 U. BALT. L.F. 104, 106 (2005) (noting that Griswold 
established the constitutional right of privacy). 
 103. Id. at 490 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
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Court, Justice Goldberg consulted what he believed was the original 
understanding of the founders.104 
In Griswold, the Court held that a Connecticut statute criminalizing 
the use of contraceptives was unconstitutional.105  “In his opinion for the 
Court, Justice Douglas wrote that the statute[] violated the right of 
marital privacy created by the penumbral rights emanating from specific 
guarantees in the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments.”106  
However, it was Justice Goldberg’s opinion that placed the interpretation 
of the Ninth Amendment into sudden discussion.107  Justice Goldberg 
stated that “[t]he language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal 
that the Framers of the Constitution believed that there are additional 
fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringement, which 
exist alongside those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the 
first eight constitutional amendments.”108  He went on to explain that the 
Ninth Amendment was specifically passed to “quiet the expressed fears 
that a bill of specifically enumerated rights could not be sufficiently 
broad to cover all essential rights and that a specific mention of certain 
rights would be interpreted as a denial that others were protected.”109  
Justice Goldberg did, however, recognize that the Ninth Amendment did 
not constitute 
an independent source of rights protected from infringement by either 
the States or the Federal Government.  Rather, the Ninth Amendment 
shows a belief of the Constitution’s authors that fundamental rights 
exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first eight amendments 
and an intent that the list of rights included there not be deemed 
exhaustive.110 
Since Griswold, several Supreme Court decisions have alluded to 
Ninth Amendment rights without further explaining exactly what 
unenumerated rights the Ninth Amendment might include.111  The 
                                                     
 104. See id. at 488–90 & n.4 (reviewing statements made by James Madison, Alexander 
Hamilton, and Justice Story regarding the adoption of the Ninth Amendment). 
 105. Id. at 485 (majority opinon); see also Caplan, supra note 100, at 224. 
 106. Caplan, supra note 100, at 224–25 (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482–86 (Goldberg, J., 
concurring)). 
 107. See id. at 225 (“But it was Justice Goldberg’s concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice 
Warren and Justice Brennan, that catapulted the ninth into sudden respectability.”). 
 108. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 109. Id. at 488–89. 
 110. Id. at 492. 
 111. Caplan, supra note 100, at 225–26 (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 
555, 579 n.15 (1980); Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 606 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Planned 
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reluctance of the Court to further explain the interpretation behind the 
Ninth Amendment is difficult to understand.  Not surprisingly, 
competing interpretations exist over the meaning of the Ninth 
Amendment. 
2. Competing Interpretations of the Ninth Amendment 
“Two interpretations of the Ninth Amendment dominate the current 
debate over its proper application.”112  First, the “unenumerated rights” 
view, which follows Justice Goldberg’s approach, states that the Ninth 
Amendment clearly “protects judicially enforceable unenumerated 
rights.”113  In other words, under the Ninth Amendment, courts may 
enforce rights that are not explicitly written in the Constitution,114 such as 
statutory rights as well as common law rights. 
The second interpretation, the “limited government” view, states that 
the Ninth Amendment “clarifies that the list of enumerated rights in the 
first eight amendments does not grant the federal government residual or 
unenumerated powers.”115  Stated differently, no individual “can use the 
existence of the Bill of Rights to argue that the federal government has 
powers which the Constitution does not specifically list.”116  Those that 
support the “limited government” view would likely argue that “the 
Constitution does not give the federal government the power to appoint 
state court judges and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
cannot justify granting the federal government that power.”117 
                                                                                                                       
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 60 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 59 n.67, 84 n.113 
(1976) (per curiam)).  But see  Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 721 n.* (1974) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (“But the right to vote in state elections is one of the rights ‘retained by the people’ by 
virtue of the Ninth Amendment as well as included in the penumbra of First Amendment rights.”); 
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 233–34 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that “the right 
of the people to education or to work or to recreation . . . , like the right to pure air and pure water, 
may well be rights ‘retained by the people’ under the Ninth Amendment.”). 
 112. Cameron S. Matheson, The Once and Future Ninth Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REV. 179, 184 
(1996) (citing Raoul Berger, Suzanna and—the Ninth Amendment, 1994 BYU L. REV. 51 (1994); 
Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1215 
(1990); Suzanna Sherry, The Ninth Amendment: Righting an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 1001 (1988)). 
 113. Matheson, supra note 112, at 184. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 185. 
 116. Id. (citing McAffee, supra note 112, at 1307). 
 117. Id. 
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a. Unenumerated Rights View 
Supporters of the “unenumerated rights” view maintain this position 
with three main arguments: “a historical, a contextual and a textual 
argument.”118  The historical view is based on the Framers’ intent in 
enacting the amendment.  As indicated previously, the Framers believed 
that there were additional fundamental rights, which were protected from 
governmental intrusion, and that to overcome the fears of a bill that only 
listed specific rights, the Ninth Amendment was enacted.119  In other 
words, people feared that listing some rights in the Constitution would 
imply that no other rights existed.120  Thus, from a historical standpoint, 
proponents conclude that the Ninth Amendment clearly protects 
unenumerated rights. 
The contextual argument states that the “limited government” 
argument renders the Ninth Amendment superfluous because, under that 
interpretation, “it would be identical to the Tenth Amendment.”121  “The 
Tenth Amendment safeguards the system of enumerated powers by 
reserving to the states and the people all powers not expressly given to 
the federal government.”122  Thus, opponents of the “unenumerated 
rights” interpretation that support the contextual argument would 
conclude that one should not read the Ninth Amendment as identical to 
the Tenth Amendment.  Justice Marshall further provides support for this 
view: “It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is 
intended to be without effect.”123 
Finally, the textual argument claims that the basic meaning of the 
text supports the “unenumerated rights” view and counters any “limited 
government” view.124  Proponents of the “unenumerated rights” view 
focus directly on the text of the amendment.  Specifically, that the Ninth 
Amendment, “with its message, as plain as one might hope for given the 
vagaries of language,” stands for the idea “that the specification of some  
 
                                                     
 118. Id. (citing Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Rhetoric and the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 131, 140–42 (1988)). 
 119. See supra notes 105–10 and accompanying text. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Matheson, supra note 112, at 185. 
 122. Id.  The Tenth Amendment states: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 123. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). 
 124. Matheson, supra note 112, at 186. 
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rights was not to be interpreted as denying the equal presence within the 
legal system of other, unenumerated rights.”125 
According to this textual argument, “the plain language of the Ninth 
Amendment forecloses the ‘limited government’ view.”126  Although the 
Tenth Amendment speaks of powers, “the Ninth refers to rights.”127  The 
Constitution does not assign the government authority “in certain areas 
even if legislation would not otherwise violate people’s individual 
rights.”128  However, the Constitution does “grant power to the federal 
government in certain areas where legislation might violate individual 
rights.”129  Therefore, “the Tenth Amendment limits the federal 
government’s power but does not protect individual rights.”130  However, 
the Ninth Amendment “protects the rights of the people by limiting the 
means that the federal government can choose to achieve enumerated 
powers.”131  This textual distinction, therefore, indicates to the 
“unenumerated rights” advocates “that the Ninth Amendment limits the 
government in a substantially different way than the Tenth 
Amendment.”132 
b. Limited Government View 
Like the unenumerated rights proponents, supporters of the “limited 
government” view “support their position with historical, contextual and 
textual arguments.”133  Accordingly, “the key to discovering the meaning 
of the Ninth Amendment lies in the debate over the inclusion of a bill of 
rights in the Constitution.”134  “According to the ‘limited government’ 
[perspective], Federalists feared including a bill of rights in the 
Constitution for only one reason.”135  These Federalists expressed 
apprehension that “the inclusion of a bill of rights would imply that the 
federal government had powers beyond those enumerated in the 
                                                     
 125. Id. (quoting Levinson, supra note 118, at 141). 
 126. Id. at 186 (citing Levinson, supra note 118, at 142). 
 127. Id. (citing Levinson, supra note 118, at 142). 
 128. Id. (citing Levinson, supra note 118, at 142). 
 129. Id. (citing Levinson, supra note 118, at 142). 
 130. Id. (citing Levinson, supra note 118, at 142). 
 131. Id. (citing Levinson, supra note 118, at 186). 
 132. Id. (citing Levinson, supra note 118, at 142). 
 133. Id. at 187 (citing McAffee, supra note 112). 
 134. Id. (citing McAffee, supra note 112, at 1237). 
 135. Matheson, supra note 112, at 187 (citing McAffee, supra note 112, at 1250, 1259–60, 
1285). 
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Constitution.”136  According to “limited government” supporters, 
Madison’s speech discussing the function of the Ninth Amendment does 
not refer to specific unenumerated rights, but rather raises the concern 
that “enumerating exceptions to federal power would imply that powers 
not denied by the bill of rights would be ‘assigned into the hands of the 
General Government.’”137  “Limited government” proponents conclude 
that Madison proposed the Ninth Amendment to remedy this fear.138 
The contextual argument states: 
 
[T]he “limited government” interpretation does not render the Ninth 
Amendment superfluous because the “limited government” does 
distinguish between the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.  According to 
this interpretation, “the Tenth Amendment clarified that the federal 
government was one of enumerated powers.  The Framers designed the 
Constitution as a limited grant of power to the federal government.  
Before inclusion of the Tenth Amendment, the Constitution did not 
explicitly state the limited nature of its grant of power; however, 
Article I had hinted at this design.  According to proponents of the 
“limited government” view, the Ninth Amendment clarified that the 
Bill of Rights in no way altered the federal system of enumerated 
powers.  Thus proponents of the “limited government” view contend 
that the Tenth Amendment remedied the threat posed by the lack of an 
express constitutional provision stating that the federal government 
could exercise only enumerated powers while the Ninth Amendment 
remedied the threat posed by a bill of rights.139 
The final argument upholding the “limited government” view of the 
Ninth Amendment, the “textual argument,” states that 
the Ninth Amendment limits the federal government to its enumerated 
powers [regardless of] the fact that it refers to “rights” and the 
“people.”  According to the “limited government” [theory], the Framers 
used the terms “powers” and “rights” almost interchangeably . . . .  
[T]herefore, some commentators conclude that the text of the Ninth 
Amendment does not foreclose the “limited government” 
interpretation.140 
                                                     
 136. Id. (citing McAffee, supra note 112, at 1250, 1259–60, 1285). 
 137. Id. (quoting McAffee, supra note 112, at 1285). 
 138. Id. (citing McAffee, supra note 112, at 1283–85). 
 139. Id. at 187–88 (internal citations omitted). 
 140. Id. at 188. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. Parental Rights Preserved by the Ninth Amendment 
Because the “unenumerated rights” view focuses on the Framers’ 
intent and the pure text of the Amendment, it provides a superior analysis 
in establishing parental rights.  This argument is consistent with Justice 
Goldberg’s concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,141 which the 
Court has never overturned and arguably remains a valid interpretation of 
the Ninth Amendment.  Not surprisingly, courts have identified the Ninth 
Amendment as a source of constitutional protection for parental rights.142  
By enacting the Ninth Amendment, the Framers’ undeniably intended to 
secure parental rights as an “enduring American tradition.”143 
Is it sufficient to assume Framers of the Constitution, and the 
individuals who voted it into existence, meant exactly what it says?  The 
Supreme Court has expressed its view regarding constitutional 
interpretation by stating that 
there is a well settled rule which we must observe.  The object of 
construction, applied to a constitution, is to give effect to the intent of 
its framers, and of the people in adopting it.  This intent is to be found 
in the instrument itself; and when the text of a constitutional provision 
is not ambiguous, the courts, in giving construction thereto, are not at 
liberty to search for its meaning beyond the instrument.  To get at the 
thought or meaning expressed in a statute, a contract, or a constitution, 
the first resort, in all cases, is to the natural signification of the words, 
in the order of grammatical arrangement in which the framers of the 
instrument have placed them.  If the words convey a definite meaning, 
which involves no absurdity, nor any contradiction of other parts of the 
instrument, then that meaning, apparent on the face of the instrument, 
must be accepted, and neither the courts nor the legislature have the 
right to add to it or take from it.  So, also, where a law is expressed in 
basic and unambiguous terms, the legislature should be intended to 
mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is 
left for construction.144 
                                                     
 141. 381 U.S. 479, 486–99 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 142. See In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1377 (Utah 1982) (discussing the Ninth Amendment and its 
relation to parental rights). 
 143. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (stating that the “‘fundamental interest 
of parents’ in the upbringing of their children is an enduring American tradition”). 
 144. Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670–71 (1889). 
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The Ninth Amendment protects rights “retained by the people.”145  
The phrase “retained by the people” is apparent on the face of the 
amendment.146  Because “[t]he simplest and most obvious interpretation 
of a constitution . . . is the most likely to be that meant by the people in 
its adoption,”147 it is proper to discuss the English and early-American 
common law when evaluating constitutional protections, such as parental 
rights.148  By discussing the rights held by the people at the time the 
Ninth Amendment was enacted, one may deduce which rights the 
Framers intended to retain.  Illustrative of this idea is the 1935 case of 
Dimick v. Schiedt,149 where the Court discussed the meaning of the 
Seventh Amendment.  In so doing, the Court stated that “[i]n order to 
ascertain the scope and meaning of the Seventh Amendment, resort must 
be had to the appropriate rules of the common law established at the time 
of the adoption of that constitutional provision in 1791.”150  Hence, the 
question to ask is whether parental rights at common law were 
consistently recognized as rights “retained by the people.” 
In English common law, “a parent’s right to custody and control of 
minor children was a sacred right with which courts would not interfere 
except where by conduct the parent abdicated or forfeited that right.”151  
A plurality of the Supreme Court has stated “the interest of parents in the 
care, custody, and control of their children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the 
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”152  Moreover, 
“‘[t]he history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong 
tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their 
children.’”153  “‘This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of 
their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American 
tradition.’”154 
The intent of the Ninth Amendment was to encompass parental 
rights.  This argument is strongly supported by the American common 
law presumption that parents were in the position to act out of an interest 
                                                     
 145. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 671. 
 148. See generally Daniel E. Witte, Comment, People v. Bennett: Analytic Approaches to 
Recognizing a Fundamental Parental Right Under the Ninth Amendment, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REV. 183 
(1996) (providing an analytical framework of the original intent approach). 
 149. 293 U.S. 474 (1935). 
 150. Id. at 476. 
 151. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 152. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
 153. Id. at 66 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972)). 
 154. Id. (quoting Yoder). 
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shared with their child.  “It is fundamental to our jurisprudence that ‘the 
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents.’”155  
“Early common law, as well as many modern common law decisions, 
protected parental rights by in effect presuming not only that parents 
shared a common interest with children, but that the state shared a 
common interest with the parent.”156  Early common law required the 
state first to show that the “child, state, and parental interests were 
disparate, and second to show that some interest was sufficiently 
compelling to override parental custody.”157  In other words, just 
“because the decision of a parent [was] not agreeable to a child or 
because it involves risks [did] not automatically transfer the power to 
make that decision from the parents to some agency or officer of the 
state.”158  Stated boldly, “the statist notion that governmental power 
should supersede parental authority in all cases because some parents 
abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American tradition.”159 
Critics may argue that by relying on the original intent approach the 
judicial system focuses on outdated and inapplicable principles.160  
However, a departure from the import and meaning of the language used 
to express intent jeopardizes the Constitution’s integrity.  By looking for 
probable meanings not clearly embraced within the language of the text, 
one risks falling into the trap of misinterpretation.  In People v. Purdy, 
Justice Bronson commented on such danger: 
In this way a solemn instrument, for so I think the constitution should 
be considered, is made to mean one thing by one man, and something 
else by another, until in the end it is in danger of being rendered a mere 
dead letter; and that, too, where the language is so plain and explicit 
that it is impossible to make it mean more than one thing, unless we 
first lose sight of the instrument itself and allow ourselves to roam at 
large in the boundless field of speculation.  For one, I dare not venture 
upon such a course.  Written constitutions of government will soon 
come to be regarded as of little value, if their injunctions may be thus 
lightly overlooked; and the experiment of setting a boundary to power, 
will prove a failure.161 
                                                     
 155. In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1372 (Utah 1982) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 
158, 166 (1944)). 
 156. Witte, supra note 148, at 220. 
 157. Id. (citing Davier v. Jurney, 145 A.2d 846, 849 (D.C. 1958)). 
 158. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979). 
 159. Witte, supra note 148, at 220. 
 160. Id. at 221 (citing Roberts v. Ward, 493 A.2d 478, 481 (N.H. 1985)). 
 161. People v. Purdy, 2 Hill 31, 36 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841), rev’d on other grounds, 4 Hill 384 
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Words are intended to convey a definite meaning.  They are the 
“common signs that mankind make use of to declare their intention to 
one another; and when the words of a man express his meaning plainly, 
distinctly and perfectly, we have no occasion to have recourse to any 
other means of interpretation.”162  Thus, where a writing is “expressed in 
plain and unambiguous terms, whether those terms are general or limited, 
the legislature should be intended to mean what they have plainly 
expressed, and consequently no room is left for construction.”163 
Moreover, these critics have failed to recognize recent courts’ 
applications of this interpretative tool to the language of the Ninth 
Amendment.  For example, in discussing the language of the Ninth 
Amendment, Justice Oaks of the Utah Supreme Court stated that “[t]he 
rights inherent in family relationships—husband-wife, parent-child, and 
sibling—are the most obvious examples of rights retained by the 
people.”164  He went on to further state that these rights “are ‘natural,’ 
‘intrinsic,’ or ‘prior’ in the sense that our Constitutions presuppose them, 
as they presuppose the right to own and dispose of property.”165 
This parental right transcends all property and economic rights.  It is 
rooted not in state or federal statutory or constitutional law, to which it 
is logically and chronologically prior, but in nature and human instinct.  
Thus, the United States Supreme Court has declared that “the liberty 
interest in family privacy has its source . . . in intrinsic human rights . . . 
.”166 
Supporters of the “unenumerated rights” view maintain their position 
with several theories.  These arguments focus on the plain meaning of 
the text and the Framers’ intent in enacting the amendment.167  As 
demonstrated by both recent cases and those dealing with early common 
law, there is ample reason for courts to rely on the “unenumerated rights” 
view.  The Framers believed in the existence of additional fundamental 
rights, which were protected from governmental intrusion.  The 
“unenumerated rights” approach yields a clear picture that parental rights 
are constitutionally protected under the Ninth Amendment. 
                                                                                                                       
(N.Y. 1842). 
 162. Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 671 (1889). 
 163. Id. at 670–71. 
 164. In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1373 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977)). 
 167. Matheson, supra note 112, at 186. 
HAGUE FINAL.DOC 2/23/2007  1:07:25 PM 
2006] THE NINTH AMENDMENT 451 
B. Corporal Punishment in Public Schools as a Violation of the Ninth 
Amendment 
The Supreme Court in Ingraham held that the cruel and unusual 
punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment applied only to criminal 
punishments and did not provide protection against the imposition of 
corporal penalties by school authorities.168  The Court further held that 
the procedural due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment did 
not require schools to provide notice and a hearing prior to application of 
physical discipline.169  The Court’s decision precluded constitutional 
challenges to corporal punishment because it focused solely on the rights 
of the child under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  However, 
the Court did not foreclose the argument of whether a federal cause of 
action based on parental rights was available in a corporal punishment 
case.  Specifically, they did not discuss whether the administration of 
such punishment in public schools violated the Ninth Amendment. 
Because courts have generally accorded parental rights great judicial 
deference, courts have found these rights to operate against the state.  
However, some limitations apply.  Analysis of whether the use of 
corporal punishment violates this constitutionally protected right requires 
an analysis of such limitations.  “In determining whether the state has 
violated the childrearing rights of parents, a court balances the rights of 
the parent with those of the child and the parens patriae interest of the 
state.”170  Such a determination rests on two questions: (1) whether the 
state’s interference has a coercive and adverse effect on parental 
rights;171 and (2) whether the state’s interest in interfering with parental 
rights is a safeguard to the physical or mental health, safety, or welfare of 
the child.172 
                                                     
 168. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977). 
 169. Id. at 682. 
 170. Patrick Henigan, Is Parental Authority Absolute?  Public High Schools Which Provide Gay 
and Lesbian Youth Services Do Not Violate the Constitutional Childrearing Right of Parents, 62 
BROOK. L. REV. 1261, 1290 (1996). 
 171. See Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1168 (6th Cir. 1980) (discussing cases in which the state 
infringed on parents’ rights). 
 172. See In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1377 (Utah 1980) (recognizing that the “paramount 
consideration” is the child’s welfare and parental rights are not absolute). 
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1. The Use of Corporal Punishment in Public Schools Has a Coercive 
Effect on the Child-Rearing Right of Parents 
For a violation of parental rights to exist, the alleged state 
interference must have a coercive or compulsory effect on the rights of 
the parents.173  “Coercion exists where the governmental action is 
mandatory and provides no outlet for the parents . . . .”174  For example, 
the Supreme Court stated that a “compulsory school attendance law 
violated, inter alia, Amish parents’ right to direct religious upbringing of 
their child.”175  Moreover, the Court ruled that a “law requiring public 
school attendance and prohibiting attendance at private parochial schools 
violated parental liberties.”176  Finally, the Court held that a “law 
prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages to school children violated 
parental liberties.”177  “These cases strongly imply that, in order to 
constitute a constitutional violation, the State action at issue must be 
coercive or compulsory in nature.”178 
Recently “courts have repeatedly made the distinction between 
coercive and voluntary state interference” when examining whether there 
is a violation of parental rights.179  For example, in Curtis, the court made 
this threshold determination deciding whether alleged state interference 
violated parental rights.180  In this case, parents brought an action against 
the school committee for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that a 
program of condom availability established in junior and senior high 
schools violated their parental rights.181  The court held that because the 
condoms were available to students who requested them and were 
available from a vending machine, the condoms did not coercively 
burden the parents’ rights.182  In other words, the students were free to 
participate in the program and free to decline to participate in the 
program.  No disciplinary action would ensue if a student did not 
participate. 
                                                     
 173. See Doe, 615 F.2d at 1168 (finding no infringement on parental rights when a state 
“imposed no compulsory requirements or prohibition which affect rights of the [parents]”). 
 174. Curtis v. Sch. Comm., 652 N.E.2d 580, 586 (Mass. 1995). 
 175. Id. (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972)). 
 176. Id. (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925)). 
 177. Id. at 586–87 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923)). 
 178. Curtis, 652 N.E.2d at 586. 
 179. Henigan, supra note 170, at 1276. 
 180. Curtis, 652 N.E.2d at 586. 
 181. Id. at 582. 
 182. Id. at 586. 
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In a similar case, Doe v. Irwin,183 the court held that parental rights 
were not violated by a public clinic that made contraceptives available to 
minors because the state did not require or prohibit an activity that had a 
coercive or compulsory effect on the parents’ rights.184  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court stated: 
The State of Michigan . . . has imposed no compulsory requirements or 
prohibitions which affect rights of the plaintiffs.  It has merely 
established a voluntary birth control clinic.  There is no requirement 
that the children of the plaintiffs avail themselves of the services 
offered by the Center and no prohibition against the plaintiffs’ 
participating in decisions of their minor children on issues of sexual 
activity and birth control.  The plaintiffs remain free to exercise their 
traditional care, custody and control over their unemancipated 
children.185 
Certain courts have thus held that a violation of parental rights 
occurs when parents are forced to rear their children in a particular 
manner or accept a practice contrary to their values.186  The use of 
corporal punishment in public schools has a clear compulsory effect on 
parental rights.  Corporal punishment forces minor children to be 
subjected to abuse without parental input and within the compulsory 
setting of the public school.  Parents have a constitutionally protected 
right to intervene and prohibit the state from inflicting such punishment 
on their children.  The use of corporal punishment provides no outlet for 
the parents because the child is in no position to refuse such treatment. 
The administration of corporal punishment is clearly distinguishable 
from the above-mentioned cases, in which the courts held that no 
constitutional violation existed.  Corporal punishment in public schools 
is not voluntary.  Parents do not purposefully subject their children to 
beatings in schools, nor do children subject themselves to such treatment.  
In Curtis, the court held that the parents had the option to instruct their 
children not to participate in the condom program, thereby rendering 
their compulsion claim ineffective.187  Unlike Curtis, parents do not have 
the option to refuse the administration of corporal punishment to their 
                                                     
 183. 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1980). 
 184. Id. at 1168. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401–02 (1923) (recognizing a violation on the 
child-rearing right when the alleged state interference requires or prohibits some activity within an 
aspect of protected parenting). 
 187. Curtis v. Sch. Comm., 652 N.E.2d 580, 586 (Mass. 1995). 
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children.  In fact, by refusing to submit to such punishment, a child risks 
harsher subsequent punishments.  For example, in Georgia, an eight-
year-old boy was paddled for failure to turn in a homework 
assignment,188 and when the child attempted to shield himself from a 
second blow of the paddle by placing his hands behind him, his principal 
broke the boy’s arm.189  Clearly, there was no option to refuse such 
punishment, nor were the parents consulted before the discipline was 
administered.  Thus, in a public school setting, parents do not have the 
freedom to instruct their children not to participate in the given 
punishments. 
Critics may argue that because parents can control their child’s 
behavior, they voluntarily choose whether the child will receive such 
discipline in the school.  However, many children are not in the position 
to understand their actions and the consequences that may follow.  
Children are unpredictable, and oftentimes are unlikely able to make any 
connection between their behavior and physical punishment.190 
Child development and behavior are instilled within the home.  
Parents have a right and “desire to pass on a cultural tradition, to 
inculcate religious beliefs, to foster an understanding of the good life, to 
promote certain values and attitudes—in short, forming the character of 
their children.”191  Undoubtedly, “parents want the schools their children 
attend to support and reinforce these goals.”192  Because parents have a 
constitutional right to control the upbringing of their children, they set 
the rules and consequences in the home.  Corporal punishment in public 
schools threatens this right.  Recent research has shown that “it’s 
important to be consistent in disciplining your child.  If you don’t stick to 
the rules and consequences that you set up, your child isn’t likely to 
either.”193  Corporal punishment requires parents to subject their children 
to inconsistent forms of punishment.  For example, many parents use 
timeouts as a means of discipline.  Timeouts are considered an effective 
form of discipline for a child.194  If a child was taught from ages one 
through five that as a consequence for misbehaving, a timeout would be 
                                                     
 188. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 189. Id. at 713–14. 
 190. See Disciplining Your Child, http://kidshealth.org/parent/emotions/behavior/discipline.html 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2006) (“It’s important to not spank, hit or slap a child . . . [because they are] 
unlikely to be able to make any connection between their behavior and physical punishment.”). 
 191. R. KENNETH GODWIN &  FRANK R. KEMERER, SCHOOL CHOICE TRADEOFFS: LIBERTY, 
EQUITY, AND DIVERSITY 99 (2002). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Disciplining Your Child, supra note 190. 
 194. Id. 
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required, the use of corporal punishment in school would seriously 
undermine this technique.  A child struck by a wooden paddle will only 
feel the pain of the hit, but will not understand the connection between 
the behavior and the violent punishment administered.  Such use of 
punishment may motivate the child to change his or her behavior in a 
negative way because everything they have learned at home has been 
completely taken away. 
Children learn behavior and practices “by watching adults, 
particularly their parents.”195  Parents act according to the standards they 
have set in the home.  “Small equivocations in parents can produce large 
deviations in their children . . . .”196  For this reason, parents try to set a 
positive example for their children.  Along these lines, “[s]chool 
personnel, especially teachers, have psychologically powerful 
relationships with children.”197  In fact, “[l]ike parents, teachers’ 
acceptance or rejection greatly influence how children feel about 
themselves, and how they behave.  Children who feel accepted operate 
with a sense of self-worth and usually in very positive ways; children 
who feel rejected often act in disruptive, disrespectful and violent 
ways.”198  This provides teachers with the opportunity to either uphold 
the positive principles set in the home, or destroy their very foundation. 
Corporal punishment in public schools forces parents to abandon 
disciplinary measures and requires them to accept other forms of 
discipline that may run contrary to their beliefs and standards.  This is the 
clearest sign of governmental intrusion.  “Aspects of child rearing 
protected from unnecessary intrusion by government include inculcation 
of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good 
citizenship.”199  The administration of corporal punishment offered in 
public schools amounts to unconstitutional interference with parental 
liberties because it places a coercive and compulsory burden on their 
rights. 
                                                     
 195. Id. 
 196. Neal A. Maxwell, Settle This in Your Hearts, ENSIGN, available at http://library.lds.org 
(click on “magazines”; then click Ensign; then type “Settle This in Your Hearts” in the quick search; 
then follow the link to “Settle This in Your Hearts”). 
 197. Alvy, supra note 38. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Curtis v. Sch. Comm., 652 N.E.2d  580, 585 (Mass. 1995) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205, 232–33 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944); Pierce v. Soc’y of 
the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923)). 
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2. The Use of Corporal Punishment in Public Schools Undermines the 
Role of Parens Patriae 
Even if the alleged interference on parental rights is coercive or 
compulsory, “the state can affect the parent-child relationship if there is a 
compelling reason to do so, thus limiting parental control even 
further.”200  “[P]arental rights, though inherent and retained, are not 
absolute . . . .”201  “The state, as parens patriae, has the authority and 
obligation to assume a parental role after the natural parent has been 
shown to be unfit or disfunctional; and . . . parental prerogatives cannot, 
at that extreme point, frustrate the state in discharging its duty.”202  “The 
concept of parens patriae allows the state to burden the constitutional 
rights of . . . a parent . . . in order to protect children.203  This concept 
“became widely accepted in the nineteenth century as the United States 
industrialized.”204  The poverty and child labor that materialized with 
new industries frequently jeopardized “the physical, mental or emotional 
health and safety of children.”205  “Because of this danger, . . . American 
courts . . . exercised parens patriae authority over children to protect 
them” and ensure their safety.206  “The state entrusted a parent with a 
child only so long as the parent acted in the child’s best interest.”207 
Although there is a presumption that parents act in the best interest 
of their child because a parent “possess[es] what a child lacks in 
maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment,”208 the modern state still 
has a significant interest in safeguarding the physical or mental health, 
safety, and welfare of its youth.209  The state acts in the parens patriae 
role when it requires children to attend school,210 orders children to 
participate in medical treatment,211 forbids children from engaging in 
                                                     
 200. Henigan, supra note 170, at 1278. 
 201. In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1377 (Utah 1980). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Henigan, supra note 170, at 1278 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990)). 
 204. Id. (citing LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 1.02, at 10 (Donald T. Kramer ed., 2d ed. 1994)). 
 205. Id. (citing LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 204). 
 206. Id. (citing Susan B. Hershkowitz, Due Process and the Termination of Parental Rights, 19 
FAM. L.Q. 245, 254–55 (1985)). 
 207. Id. at 1279 (citing Raymond C. O’Brien, An Analysis of Realistic Due Process Rights of 
Children Versus Parents, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1209, 1216 (1944)). 
 208. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). 
 209. See Michael J. Florio, An Abused Child’s Right to Life, Liberty, and Property in the Home: 
Constitutional Approval of State Inaction, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 175, 178 (1989) (discussing the state’s 
stake in a child’s welfare). 
 210. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (discussing the state’s power to educate 
its citizens). 
 211. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (discussing authority and power of 
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certain types of labors,212 denies children the right to marry,213 and 
prohibits the sale of pornographic material to them.214 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the state can usurp parental 
rights to protect the physical, mental, and emotional health of children.215  
In Prince, the Court upheld the conviction of a parent who permitted one 
of her children to sell copies of religious publications in violation of 
Massachusetts labor laws.216  In reaching its conclusion, the Court stated 
that 
[i]t is the interest of youth itself, and of the whole community, that 
children be both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for 
growth into free and independent well-developed . . . citizens . . . .  
[Therefore] the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental 
freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s welfare . . . .217 
Parham v. J.R. illustrates the states’ parens patriae interest in the 
health and welfare of a child.218  In this case, the Court recognized that 
“some parents may at times be acting against the interests of their 
children,” although “parents generally do act in the child’s best 
interest.”219  In Parham, both the majority and the dissent concluded that 
parents do not have absolute rights to determine the destiny of their 
children because a state may override a parental decision when the 
physical or mental health of a child is jeopardized.220  Thus, it is 
imperative to this analysis to determine whether the state’s interest in 
administering corporal punishment in public schools is a safeguard to the 
physical or mental health, safety, or welfare of the child.  Obviously, “a 
                                                                                                                       
the state to regulate public health). 
 212. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170–71 (1944) (sustaining the conviction 
of the guardian of a nine-year-old girl for violating the Massachusetts Child Labor Law). 
 213. See, e.g., Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623, 630–31 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (sustaining New 
York’s requirement of parental consent for marriages of persons between the ages of fourteen and 
eighteen), aff’d, 669 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 214. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637–43 (1968) (sustaining a New York 
statute making the act of knowingly selling pornographic materials to anyone under the age of 
seventeen unlawful). 
 215. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (noting that the state “may restrict the parent’s control by 
requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor, and in many other ways”). 
 216. Id. at 171. 
 217. Id. at 165, 167. 
 218. See 442 U.S. 584, 587 (1979) (presenting the question on appeal as what process is 
constitutionally due when parents or a guardian seek state administered institutional mental health 
care for a minor child). 
 219. Id. at 602–03 (citing Robert M. Rolfe & Anne v. MacCintock, The Due Process Rights of 
Minors “Voluntarily Admitted” to Mental Institutions, 4 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 333, 348–49 (1976)). 
 220. Id. at 604, 630. 
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State’s interest in universal education . . . is not totally free from a 
balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and 
interests.”221 
If the Ninth Amendment provides a source of protection for parental 
rights, then the state must have a compelling reason to inflict corporal 
punishment in public schools.  “A state’s interest in protecting the 
welfare of children sometimes outweighs the childrearing right of parents 
when there is evidence that the state needs to protect children.”222  
However, when there is insufficient evidence supporting the state’s right 
to infringe upon the parental relationship, the Court will conclude that 
the parents’ rights outweigh the state’s interest.223 
Does the use of corporal punishment in public schools benefit the 
children in any way? Unfortunately, state governments routinely 
investigate suspected occurrences of child abuse, and, in appropriate 
cases, a court order can either limit or terminate parental rights to the 
custody of minor children.224  Interestingly enough, when the state, as 
parens patriae, fails to protect the child from parent’s physical abuse, a 
constitutional violation occurs.225  Because of this mandate, the role of 
parens patriae is clearly beneficial to the child because it protects his 
interests in the home, particularly from physical abuse.  However, who 
protects the child when he enters the school building?  Does a state’s role 
as parens patriae allow the state to administer the very punishment it 
attempts to prohibit in the home?  Without the existence of a compelling 
state interest, maintaining corporal punishment in public schools is a 
clear violation of the child-rearing rights of parents. 
Assuming the natural parents are shown to be fit and functional in 
rearing their child, the state cannot prove the existence of a compelling 
interest in maintaining corporal punishment in public schools.  The state 
can only impair the rights of parents to protect the safety and welfare of 
                                                     
 221. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510, 535 (1925)). 
 222. Henigan, supra note 170, at 1280–81. 
 223. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234 (deciding that the State of Wisconsin had produced insufficient 
evidence of harm to Amish children removed from compulsory education two years early to support 
the overriding of the parents’ decision). 
 224. See, e.g., State ex rel. Miller v. Locke, 253 S.E.2d 540, 542 (1979) (upholding the 
constitutionality of a statute permitting the removal of a child from his home for up to ten days 
where there exists both an imminent danger to the child and no reasonable alternatives to removal). 
 225. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).  The statute states that: 
Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, 
of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . . 
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the child.  “A natural parent who has demonstrated sufficient 
commitment to his or her children is thereafter entitled to raise the 
children free from undue state interference.”226  The Supreme Court has 
held “that there exists ‘a private realm of family life which the state 
cannot enter.’”227  Thus, when the government intrudes on choices 
concerning the nonabusive disciplinary measures of the household, it has 
clearly entered this “private realm.” 
The use of corporal punishment does not protect the welfare of 
children.  To the contrary, corporal punishment, as a teaching tool, is 
simply ineffective, or, at best, no more effective than nonviolent 
disciplinary methods that do not carry the risk of individual or societal 
harm.228  Corporal punishment as a teaching tool undermines educational 
policies as a whole.  The Supreme Court has noted that “teachers shall be 
of good moral character . . . and that nothing be taught which is 
manifestly inimical to the public welfare.”229  “Physical cruelty and 
emotional humiliation not only leave their marks on children, they also 
inflict a disastrous imprint on the future of our society.”230  In other 
words, when a child attends school, not only does he risk being damaged 
personally, but also the future of our society is subjected to risk.  When 
the state, acting in a parens patriae role, permits the administration of 
corporal punishment in public schools, it is clearly not trying to ensure a 
child’s health and welfare are protected.  Instead, it penetrates the safety 
and security created in the home and disrupts a child’s formative years. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although states have made significant progress in reducing the 
incidence of corporal punishment in public schools since Ingraham, 
children continue to be physically abused at school every year.  In 
addressing the United States Congress, Representative Major R. Owens, 
chairman of the House Subcommittee on Select Education, stated that: 
“Every year an estimated one million American school children are 
beaten, pinched, slapped, punched, whipped, paddled, thrown against 
walls, stuck with pins, locked in closets, forced to eat noxious 
substances, and abused in countless other creatively sadistic ways by 
                                                     
 226. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 447 (1990) (plurality opinion). 
 227. Id. (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). 
 228. See Pollard, supra note 34, at 575 (discussing the consequences of corporal punishment). 
 229. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925). 
 230. Alice Miller, Every Smack is a Humiliation, PROJECT NOSPANK (1998), http:// 
www.nospank.net/miller3.htm. 
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teachers and school administrators across the country.”231  The harms to 
children as a result of corporal punishment include lower self-esteem, 
depressed cognitive development, lower scholastic achievement, 
increased rates of violence against themselves and others, increased drug 
abuse, increased psychological and physical illnesses, and a likelihood of 
future violence when they become adults.232  The Supreme Court’s 
refusal to resolve the conflict over corporal punishment in public schools 
perpetuates the uncertainty over children and parents’ legal rights. 
Fortunately, a substantial justification exists for recognizing a 
fundamental parental right under the Ninth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.  This inherent right is the most obvious example of 
rights “retained by the people.”233  “The fact that no particular provision 
of the Constitution explicitly forbids the State from disrupting the 
traditional relation of the family—a relation as old and as fundamental as 
our entire civilization—surely does not show that the Government was 
meant to have the power to do so.”234 
Corporal punishment in public schools unreasonably interferes with 
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and 
education of children under their control.  Corporal punishment forces 
minor children to be subjected to abuse without parental input and within 
the compulsory setting of the public school.  “It is cardinal with us that 
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, 
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations 
the state can neither supply nor hinder.”235  The use of corporal 
punishment in public schools unconstitutionally abridges  parents’ right 
to direct the upbringing of their children because it forces parents to 
accept the emotional and physical marks that corporal punishment leaves 
on their children.  The state’s interest in administering corporal 
punishment in public schools is not a safeguard to the physical or mental 
health, safety, or welfare of the child.  Thus, because the state does not 
have a compelling reason to govern the use of it, any such administration 
violates the United States Constitution. 
Although Ingraham v. Wright precluded federal constitutional 
challenges to corporal punishment based on the Eighth and Fourteenth 
                                                     
 231. Hearing on Corporal Punishment: Hearing on H.R. 1522 Before the Subcomm. on Select 
Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 102d Cong. 1 (1992) (statement of Rep. Major R. Owens, 
Chairman, Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor). 
 232. See supra Part II.A.1 (describing how corporal punishment affects children). 
 233. U.S. CONST, amend. ix. 
 234. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495–96 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 235. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
HAGUE FINAL.DOC 2/23/2007  1:07:25 PM 
2006] THE NINTH AMENDMENT 461 
Amendments, a federal cause of action based on the Ninth Amendment 
remains, and thus, the continuing legal battle against corporal 
punishment should be revisited under this approach. 
